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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/05/2006

Accident number: 369

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 14/02/1992

Where it occurred: Oupale, Xangongo,
Cunene Province

Country: Angola

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [None]

ID original source: none

Name of source: HE/HGK

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: TM57 AT blast

Ground condition: agricultural
(abandoned)
bushes/scrub
sparse trees

Date record created: 21/02/2004

Date last modified: 21/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
use of pick (?)
standing to excavate (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
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Accident report
No formal investigation of the accident was carried out. This record is derived from interviews
with the site-managers, supervisors and deminers who were present.
Clearance was being carried out without knowledge of current best-practices in Humanitarian
Demining. The demining group’s management in Europe wilfully kept the ex-pat field staff
ignorant of other HD efforts around the world. As a result, the clearance was taking place
without concern for safety distances or PPE, and without the site-manager having strict
control. The team was a small group of people who worked as a “team”, sharing decision
making and learning as they went.
A European TV camera team was present at the clearance site the day before the accident
and the Victim had been selected to feature in their filming.

The demining site
The demining group were clearing an area laid with TM62B, TM57 and TM46 Anti tank mines
with fuzes armed by clockwork. The machine dug holes at 3m spacing and the mines were
placed either by men or machine. There were two (sometimes three) rows of tank mines. In
this area, the AT mines were not protected with any AP blast mines.
Some mines in the area had been collected and removed by local people. This was in
response to a “bounty” offered for mines across the border in Namibia. The bounty was paid
by the South African armed forces based in Namibia at that time. They apparently believed
that the mines would be collected inside Namibia and so they were reducing the local risk to
their soldiers and vehicles. In fact they were encouraging civilians on both sides of the border
to take risks, and several civilians are reported to have died collecting and transporting mines.
There was almost no vegetation. Thorny bushes had been placed on top of the mines to
prevent cattle stepping on them. Mines were buried at a depth of 2-3 cm to the top of the
mine, so the fuze was frequently exposed. The pattern was obvious.
The deminers located the mines by sight, removed the thorns, exposed the mines, removed
the fuzes and carried the mines and fuzes to a collection point. Between 150 and 1200 mines
were removed each day by a team of 30 deminers.

Events leading up the accident
On the day of the accident the Victim was attempting to uncover mines with his pickaxe in
order to unscrew the fuze. This was against the rules, which stated that pickaxes were only to
be used as crowbars to lift unfuzed mines from the ground. When the Angolan supervisor told
him this was dangerous, he argued that he knew what he was doing. The attention of the
camera crew on the previous day is believed to have led to him having an inflated ego: he
though that he was too “special” to die.
When the Victim ignored the Supervisor, the Supervisor sent him ahead 50 meters to work,
telling him that he should not endanger others if he wanted to take risks.
The Victim initiated a TM-57 anti-tank mine with his pickaxe. He was killed instantly (see
photograph in Medical report). His body was thrown 15 meters from the seat of the explosion.
Medical staff were on site immediately, but could do nothing to assist the victim.

Recommendations
Site managers immediately issued clear and unambiguous instructions that deminers working
dangerously should be ordered to stop work immediately.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 473

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation:

Time to hospital:

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Body
severe Chest
severe Head
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Arm Above elbow
Arm Above elbow
Leg Above knee
Leg Above knee
FATAL
COMMENT
The victim died immediately. See photograph in Medical report.

Medical report
No formal medical report was made available. The following photograph shows the victim
immediately after the accident.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the sitesupervisor did not command the authority required to stop the victim working dangerously.
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the lifting of live mines
with a pick-axe seems obviously dangerous.
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It seems likely that the responsibilities of those in the command chain were uncertain.
However, the NGO’s command and control methods were in their infancy, and Humanitarian
Demining norms had not been established at this time so there were no approved SOPs to
adopt.
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